












ABSTRACT: This article builds on feminist readings of war and conflict generally and of the civilian immunity principle specifically to argue that gender is crucial to the story of how and why civilians are intentionally targeted by belligerents.  It demonstrates that civilian victimization is  directly linked to the gendered logic of the immunity principle. Particularly, we contend that civilian victimization is a logical extension of wars justified by protecting women and children, and that ‘civilian’ in ‘civilian victimization’ is a proxy for women. We make this argument in several steps.  First, we introduce the literature about civilian victimization, acknowledging both its insights and its blindness to gender analysis.  Second, we use feminist work on gender, war, and militarism to present the case that civilian victimization in war is a product of gendered elements of the justificatory logics of war. We then provide examples of the gendered nature of civilian victimization (specifically targeting women in wars). The article concludes by arguing that seeing civilian victimization as a gendered phenomenon has important implications for theorizing war and conflict.









Benedicte, a Baoule woman in her forties in Côte d’Ivoire told Amnesty International: 
The attackers came to our home. They hit my husband and my son and they threatened to kill us if ever we cried...I cried a lot and one of them rushed at me and tore my skirt. They raped me in front of my husband and children. They pushed me to the ground; one held my arms and another was standing, forcing my legs apart with his own while another raped me. (Amnesty International 2007) 
Sadly, while Benedicte’s story is one individual’s experience it is not unique, either in Côte d’Ivoire or in other conflicts.  Feminists have observed that rape is a weapon of war in a number of conflicts, both historical, like World War II (where an estimated 100,000 to 2 million women were raped), and contemporary, such as the conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo (where an estimated 40 women a day were raped) (Rodriguez 2007).  

Hasan Nohanovic, a survivor of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, told the US Public Broadcasting Service (PBS): 
I got stuck in Srebrenica with my family. We lived as refugees without any outside assistance. We almost died of starvation with thousands of other people ….I heard screams and shots.  I was afraid, of course ….My parents knew what was going to happen …. they knew they were going to be killed….And that was the last time I saw my family. (PBS 2006)
Unfortunately Hasan’s story is also not exceptional, either in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in other conflicts. War is not only fought against soldiers. Civilians are victimized intentionally in almost a third of conflicts where belligerents have the militarily capability of committing atrocities against them (Downes 2008; 2006; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). 

Hasan and Benedicte were both victims of intentional civilian targeting. Still, they are often distinguished not only by their different contexts, but because Benedicte’s experience is seen as gender-specific, and Hasan’s experience is seen as tragic but gender-neutral.​[1]​ This article argues that both Hasan and Benedicte have experienced ‘civilian victimization,’ and suggests that this victimization is inseparable from gender hierarchy in global politics. 

The literature in Security Studies often tells Benedicte’s story as an incidental or unintentional violation of the civilian immunity principle.  Feminist work, on the other hand, has paid substantial attention to the gendered implications of sex-specific tactics like wartime rape, as well as the ways women suffer disproportionately in war.​[2]​ This article builds on feminist readings of war and conflict generally and of the civilian immunity principle specifically to argue that gender is crucial to the story of how and why civilians are intentionally killed, raped, or abused in war.  It demonstrates that civilian victimization is directly linked to the gendered logic of the civilian immunity principle. We contend that civilian victimization is a logical extension of wars justified by protecting women and children, and that ‘civilian’ is a fundamentally gendered idea. 

We make this argument in several steps.  First, we briefly introduce Security Studies approaches to civilian victimization, acknowledging both their insights and their blindness to gender analysis.  Second, we use feminist work on gender, war, and militarism to present the case that civilian victimization in war is a product of gendered elements of the justificatory logics of war. We then provide examples of the gendered nature of civilian victimization (specifically targeting women in wars). The article concludes by arguing that seeing civilian victimization as a gendered phenomenon has important implications for theorizing war and conflict.

‘Civilian Victimization’ in War


Civilians have always suffered in war, and constitute ‘half of all war-related deaths. In the twentieth century alone, an estimated 50 million civilians perished from war-related causes, accounting for 60 percent of all deaths from warfare in the last 100 years’ (Downes 2006: 153).  If anything, since World War II, civilian suffering in wars is increasing, and in the 1990s it was estimated that nine out of ten conflict casualties were civilians (Hynes 2004: 431). Many of these civilian deaths can be classified as intentional civilian victimization.

Existing work on civilian victimization suggests that belligerents target civilians in apparent violation of international law and the civilian immunity principle. The civilian immunity principle (see Walzer 1977) argues that war-fighting parties not only have a moral responsibility to distinguish between civilians and combatants, but also to protect civilians’ ‘immunity’ from war. Though belligerents may transgress the civilian immunity system, it is perceived as a salient and enduring norm in the international system.  

Therefore, most attention to civilians in war is about unintentional harm.  The focus on unintentional civilian harm makes intentional civilian victimization seem anomalous. While some belligerents do protect civilians, others deliberately target them. Alex Downes (2006: 152-53) finds this contradiction puzzling because most states see killing civilians in war as morally wrong and strategically counterproductive. Given that, if war-fighting parties see targeting civilians as both wrong and ineffective, why do they do it? And why so frequently? 

Recently, several scholars have produced explanations for targeting civilians in wars. Many of these explanations center around the war-fighting party’s regime type, but debate the directional influence of democracy in likelihood to engage in intentional civilian victimization. Some scholars see democratic regimes as more likely to target civilians as they attempt to secure quick victories and (therefore) avoid the audience costs associated with protracted conflicts (Reiter and Stam 2002).  Others see democratic states as less likely to target civilians, arguing that the real audience cost to democratic governments comes in having to account for inhumane behavior towards civilians (see Rummel 1996; Merom 2003). Another explanation ventures away from regime type and argues that belligerents only feel obligated to obey the civilian immunity principle against opponents they see as ‘civilized,’ so they target ‘barbaric’ opponents’ civilians (Salter 2002). Other scholars, such as Downes, look to strategic variables. Downes (2008; 2006) argues that civilian victimization can be explained by a combination of desperation (intensity of the need to win the war) and war aims (particularly territorial annexation).

These various explanations omit gender analysis and define ‘civilian victimization’ as explicitly excluding wartime rape and other sex-specific tactics (see, e.g., Downes 2008: 44).  We wonder what victimized women are in war if they are not civilians, and what wartime rape and forced impregnation are if not civilian victimization. We argue that victimized women are the territory being fought over, and wartime rape is an attack on the property and pride of male/masculine enemies. ‘Civilian victimization’ is the assertion of one belligerent’s (masculine) virility and dominance and the revealing of another’s (feminized) inadequacy, often inscribed on women’s bodies. Feminist theorizing about war and militarization provides the theoretical foundation for this argument. 

Feminist Lenses: Gender, War, Militarism, and Civilian Victimization


Feminist theorizing provides tools that help account for ‘civilian victimization.’ Feminists have argued that the strategic discourses belligerents use referencing civilians are inherently gendered, and that scholarship that ignores those genderings is necessarily incomplete. We argue that belligerents who attack civilians are actually attacking women specifically, not directly as women but as symbolic centers of state, nation, and the war effort of their enemies.​[3]​  

To make this argument, we start by exploring the role women and gender play in war-legitimating discourses.  We then present feminist arguments that these gendered symbolic representations mean that belligerents’ nationalisms and patriotisms are linked to gendered understandings of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ in conflict.  Taking these arguments one step further, we make the case that the very logic that allows men to fight wars for women and gender to play a crucial role in defining state/nation also allows men and states to fight wars on and against women. 

Men, Women, and Legitimating War


Feminists have argued that ‘war as an institution depends on gendered images of combatants and civilians’ (Sjoberg 2006a: 895). Jean Elshtain (1992) has classified these gendered images as a dichotomy between ‘just warriors’ and ‘beautiful souls.’ Just warrior men are portrayed as ‘defenders of righteous causes,’ while beautiful soul women are ‘delicate’ and in need of just warriors’ protection (Elshtain 1992; Peach 1994: 152). While other scholars have complicated these tropes, feminist work continues to show the operation of overly simple gender stereotypes in war policies and performances.

 The civilian immunity principle appears to protect women, but instead is gender-subordinating and risks women’s lives.​[4]​ As Judith Gardam explains, this is because the civilian immunity principle’s ‘derivations are all gendered,’ from chivalry to religious law to state sovereignty (1993: 352). These gendered derivations rest wars’ nobility (and therefore the honor that individuals can expect as a reward for fighting) on the degree to which wars can claim to serve the function of protecting the innocent (women, nations, and states) for whom they are fought. A consequence is that women are presumed to be innocent of wars, and therefore presumed protected, regardless of whether protection is actually provided.  Feminist theorists have identified this as the ‘protection racket,’ where women are promised protection from wars by men who then take credit for protecting them, while not actually doing so (Peterson 1977; Young 2003). 

A note about what we mean by ‘women’ and ‘gender’ is appropriate. When we analyze the ‘beautiful soul’ trope, for example, we do not mean that all women are actually innocent of wars, we mean that women are portrayed as, defined as, and stereotyped as innocent of wars. Sex (male/female) and gender (masculine/feminine) are not the same, but are often framed that way in security and policy discourses. Even when women do not meet ideal-typical standards of femininity, those standards are a part of their (and all peoples’) lived experiences of gender, much like ideal-typical standards of masculinity. When feminists argue that ‘men’ protect ‘women’ in war, they mean that ‘masculinity’ protects ‘femininity’ ideationally, whether or not men (or anyone else) protects women (or anyone else) in real material terms.

By this understanding, the illusion of protection is caused and reinforced by the gendered stories of the immunity principle, which ‘may be said to legitimate the state’s constitution as the provider of security.’ (Wilcox 2011, 234). In other words, states, by using protection discourses and self-identifying as just warriors, define their threatening behavior out of existence in public discourses of state identity, nationalism, and state interests. This allows the state to threaten its own (particularly female) citizens while defining itself by protecting them. As such, wars are often couched in terms of the need to protect women, even when that is not their primary purpose or goal.​[5]​ Just warriors, who are characterized as righteous by default, ‘protect’ women, who are categorized as helpless by default. 

Therefore, protecting ‘their women’ provides legitimacy and justification for men’s (and masculine states’) making wars (Young 2003: 4).  The gendered protection racket can even be characterized as a creating condition of possibility for war, since innocent, defenseless women (and their love and virtue) to fight for motivate men to fight, even absent other motivation (Huston 1983: 279). 

War, then, privileges masculinity and (by association) men, because ‘the social construct of what it is to be male ….is represented by the male warrior, the defender of the security of the state’ (Gardam 1993: 348). This masculinity is necessarily framed in opposition to subordinated femininities because just warriors/(brave men) cannot be heroes without beautiful souls/(innocent women) to perform heroics to save, and in opposition to feminized subordinate masculinities of men who cannot and/or will not perform protection. What just warriors have defended, throughout history, is ‘their’ women and children (Sjoberg and Peet 2011).  Therefore, stereotypical notions of soldierly masculinity ‘glue the army together and keep the men in line or at least enough for the organization to produce its violent effects’ (Connell 1995: 214). These violent effects are ‘humanized by their function of protecting women, because just warriors make the world safe for their women and protect other women who are being abused’ (Sjoberg 2006a: 903). 

Women’s need for protection justifies wars, but it also justifies the social dominance of masculinity, a requirement of war-fighting.  Defining women as innocent and in need of protection, then, is not only productive of gender subordination but also of war itself, which it justifies and makes noble. Masculinity becomes that which defends the nation while femininity holds it together, and women’s need for protection and men’s obligation to protect combine to justify both wars and individuals fighting in them.  As the rest of this article explores, this symbolic logic has an even uglier underside, as it serves as the underlying justification for (gendered) civilian victimization in war(s).





The roles of women as beautiful souls and men as just warriors also reproduce and are reproduced in gendered conceptions of state/nation. Feminists see gender subordination and national pride as inseparable, arguing that ‘despite nationalisms’ ideological investment in the ideal of popular unity, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender difference’ (McClintock 1993: 61). Much of the reason that women occupy a symbolically ‘protected’ role is related to gendered expectations in nations, states, and ethnic groups.  

As Nira Yuval-Davis observes, ‘it is women …who reproduce nations, biologically, culturally, and symbolically’ (1997: 2).​[6]​ Jindy Pettman describes this in maternal terms, arguing that nationalisms rely on ‘construction of women as mothers of the nation, responsible for its physical, cultural, and social reproduction’ (1996: 187). Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989) identify a number of ways in which nationalism and gender are intrinsically interwoven, where women serve as biological reproducers and members of national collectives, as reproducers of the boundaries of national groups (through restrictions on sexual or marital relations), as active transmitters and producers of national culture, as symbolic signifiers of national difference, and as active participants in national struggles. In all of these ways, ‘gendered bodies and sexuality play pivotal roles as territories, markers, and reproducers of narratives of nations and other collectives’ (Yuval-Davis 1997: 39). If women are the essence of, the symbols of, and the reproduction of state, national, and/or ethnic identity, they must be protected (symbolically if not actually) at all costs.

This observation leads Anne McClintock to note that ‘all nationalisms are gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous’ (1993: 61). The first danger is a danger to women, as ‘women’s bodies, relations, and roles become the battleground for different idealized versions of the past and constructions of nationalist projects for the future’ (Pettman 1996: 193). Even in times of peace this means nationalism restricts women’s freedom over their bodies.  As Nira Yuval-Davis explains, ‘women’s positionings in and obligations to their ethnic and national … can sometimes override their reproductive rights’ (1997: 27).  Women are also ‘assigned the primary responsibility for inculcating beliefs, behaviors, and loyalties that are culturally appropriate and ensure intergeneration continuity’ (Peterson 1999: 46). Since women are central to national reproduction, their bodies often become the ‘second front’ of the conflict (Seifert 1996). As Maja Korac explains, ‘rape in war, ethnic-national war in particular, becomes a powerful symbolic weapon against the “enemy.” As women are seen as precious property of the “enemy,” women and their bodies become territories to be seized and conquered.’ (1996: 137). Women’s bodies become a battleground metaphorically in nationalist discourse and literally in conflicts. As a result, Jeanne Vickers (1993) argues that wars are fought in battles of cradles (biological reproduction) and nurseries (social reproduction) as much as they are with tanks, airplanes, and bombs. 







It follows that a group’s desire to ‘protect’ their women motivates them to attack women seen as belonging to the ‘enemy.’ As Nira Yuval-Davis has argued, ‘gender roles are at the heart of cultural constructions of social identities and collectives as well as in most cultural conflicts and contestations’ (1997: 40). Therefore, there is ‘a complex relationship between actual women’s bodies and the dangers women face and nationalist discourse using representations of women’s bodies to mark national or communal boundaries’ (Pettman 1996: 192).  Particularly, women’s bodies become the symbol of national identity and pride, where ‘the personification of nature-as-female transmutes easily to nature-as-woman, where the Motherland is a woman’s body and as such is ever in danger of violation by foreign males/sperm’ (Peterson 1999: 48).  

While that has implications for how belligerents protect their women, it also has implications for how belligerents act towards ‘others’ women, and accounts for sexual violence in wars. During conflicts, rape ‘becomes a metaphor for national humiliation ….[and] a tactic of war used to symbolically prove the superiority of one’s national group’ (Wilcox 2009: 233). Wartime rape happens largely to people identified as female, and expresses feminization even when perpetrated against men. The rape of an individual becomes the rape of the collective, since: 
The mass war rapes can be understood as an element of communication – the symbolic humiliation of the male opponent. By dishonoring a woman’s body, which symbolizes her lineage, a man can symbolically dishonor the whole lineage…. Thus, sexual violence against women became a tool of genocide for destroying the enemy’s honor, lineage, and nation. (Snyder et al. 2006) 

Feminists have traced a ‘long history of associating actual women’s rape with national, communal, and male dishonor’ (Pettman 1996: 191).  In this dynamic, raping women perceived as belonging to an enemy asserts dominance over that enemy.  Inger Skjelsbaek notes that this feminizes ‘both the sex and the ethnic/religious/political identity group to which the victim belongs’ (2001: 225). Rape functions not only to violate a particular woman and the man that she ‘belongs’ to but also ‘disrupts – by planting alien seed or destroying reproductive viability -  the maintenance of the community through time’. (Peterson 1999: 48) 

Raping women is attacking the nation in two ways. First, it is a symbolic attack on men’s virility and ability to protect their women.  In Pettman’s words, ‘rape functions as a strategy to deliver a blow against a collective enemy by striking at a group with high symbolic value’ (1996: 190). Second, it is a material attack on the sustainability of the state, nation, or ethnic group through interrupting its ability to reproduce by (physical or psychological) injury or forced impregnation. Characterized as ‘occupation of the womb’ (Fisher 1996), forced impregnation is ‘committed systematically’ and ‘generates mass terror, panic, and destruction,’ (Askin 2003) interrupting or destroying the purity traditionally associated with motherhood (of children and of nations). We argue that the logic of wartime rape and forced impregnation, however, extends to civilian victimization more generally. 





If women are the symbolic and material center of a group’s understanding of collectivity, it follows that the way to destroy that ethnic group is to attack ‘its’ women. If belligerents fight for their women, it follows that a belligerent wins absolute victory by exterminating women understood as ‘belonging’ to the opponent. 

Carl von Clausewitz’s (1992) concept of a ‘center of gravity’ is useful to understand how this works. A ‘center of gravity’ is a symbolic key to the will to fight.  While it may be material, its value is not in its materiality but in its meaning to the fighting state or group and its members. Once a belligerent has identified its opponent’s center of gravity, it is ‘the pivot against which decisive force should be applied, or, in the case of our own centers, be resolutely defended’ (Stephens and Baker 2006: 29). Strategic theory instructs that war-fighting parties should try to destroy their opponents’ centers or gravity, while protecting their own. 

War-fighting parties often see their own and their (potential or actual) enemies’ ‘centers of gravity’ in controlling and protecting ‘their women,’ If only symbolically. If protecting the feminine is a crucial cause of war, it is also a crucial strategic consideration for belligerents’ calculations of their own or their opponents’ strengths or weaknesses.  If ‘beautiful souls’ motivate fighting because they represent the good worth defending, war would be difficult to justify without them (Sjoberg 2006b). Destroying ‘beautiful souls’ could play a role in destroying both the opponent’s will to fight and (symbolically and sometimes physically) the nation itself.

Targeting women in war attacks opponents’ will to fight by robbing men of the ability to protect (and therefore of their performances of masculinity). In this understanding, women are belligerents’ centers of gravity, and ‘civilians’ are women and/or femininity. In this way, ‘Enemy Woman’s real and imagined body becomes a tool through which the nation can project its own desires and deficiencies on another’ and belligerents will attack “Enemy Woman” as a method of humiliating the Other, as a means of conquering their soul’ (Mertus 1994: 18).  

This suggests a different explanation for civilian victimization than those prominent in the current literature; one where gender is a key factor.  Belligerents attack (women) civilians for the same reason they ‘protect’ their own – because the protection racket is an underlying justification for states, governments, (even rebel groups), and their wars. If gender is a key factor in intentional civilian victimization, then the relationship between wartime rape and ‘other’ civilian victimization needs to be reevaluated.  The ‘civilian victimization’ literature separates wartime rape from ‘regular’ civilian victimization, as if they are different phenomena. While feminists have noted that both war and strategy are implicitly gendered, they often imply that the gendered nature of nationalism causes wartime rape but ‘other’ civilian victimization is either unintentional or outside the scope of gender analysis.​[7]​ We argue that ‘other’ civilian victimization, like wartime rape, is a fundamentally gendered tactic aimed at ‘civilians’ as a proxy for women/the feminine, which are a proxy for the opponent’s state/nation. The proxy of ‘women’ for ‘civilian’ is not a simple, one-to-one mapping where belligerents think (or just say) ‘civilian’ but mean ‘women’ (as women), even when belligerents admit attacking civilians. Instead, insomuch as women are indicators, signifiers, and reproducers of state/nation, belligerents attack women to attack the essence of state/nation.

We are not arguing that ‘civilian victimization’ harms women exclusively. That argument would be an oversimplified representation of a complex situation, and is not supported by the empirical record. Instead, although many tactics of civilian victimization either directly target or disproportionately victimize women, some have little sex-differential impact or target civilian men. We are arguing that ‘civilian victimization’ is, consciously or not, an attack on women/femininity. In the process, civilian men are killed and civilian men remain unharmed, but secondarily, since the ‘civilians’ who belligerents are interested in are gendered feminine. This account provides greater theoretical leverage for defining ‘civilian victimization’ and, potentially, greater empirical explanatory power for cases of targeting civilians. 





In another article, we use statistical analyses to test existing theoretical explanations (such as regime type, culture, desperation, and territorial annexation) against variables that suggest that states are attacking women directly (Sjoberg and Peet 2011).  We find the gender-based variables significant across models, explaining a significant amount of the variance in civilian victimization (Sjoberg and Peet 2011). While extensive empirical accounting for this thesis is not the primary aim of this article, this section discusses several conflicts where it is possible to see civilian victimization as a gendered tactic.

For example, we can see targeting civilians as targeting women (not as women but as a center of gravity of nation) in feminist analyses of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. (see, e.g., Olujic 1998, Olujic 1995). Though estimates vary, upwards of 200,000 people were killed, at least 30,000 raped (MacKinnon 2006) and over two million displaced (Slim 2008). The conflict involved intentional civilian victimization tactics like forced displacement, siege, massacres, mass rape, forced pregnancy and torture. Civilians ‘bore the brunt of the war in Bosnia…a November 1995 unclassified CIA memorandum estimated 156,500 civilian deaths in the country…this figure for civilian deaths far exceeded the estimate in the same report of 81,500 troops killed’ (Burg and Stroup 1999: 170). The war in Bosnia was not just a war with civilian victimization but a war of civilian victimization. 

In this conflict, women suffered the brunt of civilian victimization, both as a result of apparently gender-neutral tactics and of a systematic campaign of genocidal rape. Women were raped, both individually and as proxy for the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also being ‘raped.’ The rape of civilian women was also the ‘rape’ of nation, an idea that was reiterated by Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations addressing the Security Council in 1993:
Excellencies, Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang-raped…I do not lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know, systematic rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women in particular. (Metrovic 1999: xii) 
In this statement the rape of Bosnian women is metaphor for the destruction and ‘rape’ of a nation. This sort of ‘rape happens, not as a consequence of thoughtless, provocative, or unfortunate behavior, but as a question of national warfare’ (Hansen 2001: 59).  Lene Hansen explains that, in Bosnia, 
Raping “the nation’s women” is not only an act of violence against individual women; it also works to install a disempowered masculinity as constitutive of the identities of the nation’s men. The interconnection between individual/collective and national/gendered might also be illustrated by the way that a woman impregnated by rape can be represented as a passive ‘national’ container of a child imagined to be the future bearer of the rapist’s nationality. In this way, an individual rape can be read for its collective, national significance through the complex sign of the child’s imagined future identity as an embodiment of the enemy state. (Hansen 2001: 60)
Hansen is arguing that (raped) women signify the (raped) Bosnian nation. We agree, but argue that sexual violence is not a unique situation where ‘civilian’ signifies femininity which signifies state/nation.  That argument has been made explicitly before.  Instead, wartime sexual violence (like other civilian victimization tactics) is a way to get to the ‘heart’ (or center of gravity) of the opponent by destroying the very parts of their society which legitimate the fighting of the war in the first place – the ‘beautiful soul’ women that just warriors need to justify and motivate fighting. In other words, what Hansen sees in the rapes in the war in Bosnia, we see as part of a larger landscape of civilian victimization. 

This is evident in Serb planning for siege and depravation strategies, where Serb policy statements emphasized depriving households of resources necessary for reproduction.  It can also be seen Serbian plans for the Srebrenica massacre (of an estimated 8000 men), which was discussed as ‘cleaning houses’ in Srebrencia, as refugee women would pose ‘less resistance to repopulation’ (referring to forced impregnation) without ‘protectors and fertilizers’ (referring to a strategy for killing men as women’s fertilizers and protectors).​[8]​ Other gendered attacks on femininity as a center of gravity of Bosnian society were also carried out against men.  For example, many men and boys were castrated before they were murdered as an expression of the change from virility to powerlessness, and their nation’s change from strong to subordinate (Weitsman 2007). In other cases, men were forced to watch rapes of their wives and daughters, communicating a message of personal and national emasculation because men and (by extension) their nation were unable to ‘protect’ their women and children. Though men were the target of these tactics, the gendered dimension of civilian victimization is apparent in them. 

While the Bosnian conflict shows the variety of ways states attack civilians aiming at women and femininity (and their implications for state/nation/group), it is in some sense an easy case. Neither feminists nor mainstream security theorists explicitly argue that gender has more explanatory power in conflicts with significant sexual violence, but that is sometimes implied. Our research, however, contends that gender is an explanatory factor in intentional civilian victimization generally, not only in wars with high levels of sexual violence. 

For example, we can see belligerents targeting women in order to dislodge the enemy’s will to fight in World War I. In debating the British decision to leave the naval (‘starvation’) blockade in place on Germany between the ceasefire and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, Herbert Hoover (then Chair of the United States Food Administration) accused Winston Churchill (then a Naval Commander) of ‘fighting women and children,’ a charge that Churchill acknowledged, noting that the consequence of the blockade ‘falls mainly on women and children, upon the weak and the poor’ before defending its use (Churchill 1929; Vincent 1985). Hoover understood attacking women as key to Germany’s surrender, where Germans had laid ‘down their arms and surrender[ed] on assurances that they may have food for their women and children’ (Tansill 1952: 24). Hoover protested this ‘worst instrument of attack’ against women as symbols of Germany, arguing that the hate that comes from demonstrated inability to protect women and children even in surrender ‘never dies’ (Vincent 1985). Churchill, however, saw the continuation of the blockade (and the emasculation of German nationalism) as key to making the German defeat permanent. Both approaches acknowledge gender as a key dimension of the blockade, but they come to different ethical and prescriptive conclusions. 

We can also see sex-specific targeting of women in the Soviet offensive in Europe in 1945. Throughout the war, the Nazi regime used threats of Soviet men raping German women to motivate German soldiers, characterizing German women’s purity as key to not only German men/masculinity but also to the German state (Fehrenbach 1995).  When the Soviet forces invaded Germany, they engaged in a campaign of mass rape which ‘degraded German men, labeling them as impotent for their inability to protect German women’ (Messerschmidt 2006: 707).  The Soviet attack on German women as symbolic of the German nation worked, it ‘functioned, then, to establish masculine domination …[and] symbolized the defeat of the entire Nazi Nation’ (Messerschmidt 2006: 710). There is evidence that the Germans understood this message, as ‘indeed the very last newsreel released in 1945 showed a white fence with a desperate message scrawled on it, “protect our women and children from the Red Beast”’ (Grossman 2009: 50). 

It is not only in interstate wars that we see the targeting of women as symbolic of state, nation, and/or ethnic group. In the Rwandan genocide, women civilians were targets of violence. As Biniafer Nowrojee explains ‘the extremist propaganda which exhorted Hutu to commit the genocide specifically identified the sexuality of Tutsi women as a means …of dehumanizing and subjugating all Tutsi’ (1996:1; see Green 2004). Perpetrators killed both men and women, and perpetrated sexual violence on women (often before killing them) while men were either killed instantly or forced to watch sexual violence against women (Desforges 1999: 413). These performances of civilian victimization (as they victimized both male and female bodies) targeted women as signifiers of Tutsi identity.






Discussing wartime rape, V. Spike Peterson argues that ‘implicit in the patriarchal metaphor is a tacit agreement that men who cannot defend their woman/nation have lost their “claim” to that body, that land’ (1999:48). We see that logic not only in wartime rape but across civilian victimization in wars.  Feminists have long recognized (e.g., Huston 1983) that belligerents justify wars as necessary to protect their ‘women and children’ both as innocent people themselves and as a symbol of the purity of state and nation. Almost 200 years ago, Carl von Clausewitz told us that belligerent militaries and fighting groups will (and should) identify and attack the opponent’s motivation to fight. Putting those observations together suggests that we should expect belligerents to attack the ‘women and children’ perceived as belonging to the enemy in order to deprive the enemy of his strategic and material motivations to fight. 

Men derive honor from serving to protect women (whether or not women receive actual protection); this honor justifies (their) masculinity. Men (and nations) ‘protect’ women because that means they are ‘protecting’ the essence of state/nation. Enemy men are deprived of honor (and therefore the will to fight) by violation of ‘their’ women. In wars, then, and especially in total wars, it makes strategic sense (performatively if not materially) for warring parties to attack women, which is precisely what they do. It is possible to see this dynamic in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in World War I, in World War II, in the Rwandan genocide, and as a broader trend (Sjoberg and Peet 2011). The evidence suggests that the theoretical link that we have made in this article, that states are actually attacking women when they are attacking civilians, plays out in a variety of conflicts across a variety of cultures. It may be easy to miss when we see that not all of the civilian victims of war are women, but it is nonetheless obvious even in situations where there are substantial numbers of male civilian victims. 

The gender subordinating position women hold as social, biological, and cultural reproducers of nation and nationality is crucially linked to the ‘beautiful soul’ image of women underlying the gendered civilian immunity principle. Together, these functions of gender hierarchy in the theory and practice of both state and global politics mean that wars are fought for ‘our’ or ‘innocent’ women and fought on the bodies and lives of ‘their’ women. Gender-blind IR analysis sees this as ‘civilian immunity’ violated by ‘civilian victimization,’ but feminist analysis shows it to be ‘the protection racket’ as justification for making wars and targeting women in them.

This understanding has implications for the ways that feminist(s) thinking about Security Studies might evolve and grow. Particularly, it suggests that scholarship that sees sexism/gender bias and the war system as co-constituted and fundamentally interconnected​[9]​ is more helpful to understand civilian victimization (and perhaps war more broadly) than scholarship that frames gender’s contributions in terms of its ‘relevance’ to the (erroneous) thinking of ‘mainstream’ International Relations and/or Security Studies.​[10]​ Rape is not just a ‘weapon of war’ the same way that guns and bombs and tanks are (e.g., Carter 2010), but instead a ‘weapon of war’ that helps us see how we think erroneously not only about sexual violence but about guns and bombs and tanks as well. Gender inequality is not just a predictor of states’ likelihood to make wars (e.g., Caprioli 2004), but a constitutive feature of the justificatory logic of war(s). As such, this research suggests that a deep, transformative approach to feminist theorizing of war and conflict.

Along these lines, it suggests that it is important to think creatively about how to expose (in scholarly and policy communities) the gendered logics of intentional civilian victimization and its links to the gendered logics of war-making and war-fighting. If, until recently, intentional civilian victimization (especially by states) has been invisible in the practice of war and in wars’ moral discourses, finding ways to make it visible should be a high priority. Feminist and queer work on the question of visibility provides some potential insights into navigating these complex waters (Munoz 1999; Bettcher 2007; Moreno 2008). First, it is crucial to avoid entrenching the categories of man/woman, masculine/feminine, and just warrior/beautiful soul while emphasizing their interdependence and the important work these categories do in constructing current (oppressive) notions of gender and war (e.g., Butler 2004). Second, it is crucial to note that ‘outing’ the destructive nature of the civilian immunity principle (and the civilian victimization its logic justifies) is not in itself a productive task – its negative consequences must be watched for and minded. The potential productivity of this work is in the reconstruction of the moral frameworks for interhuman interaction that rejecting the immunity principle would necessarily require (e.g., Bettcher 2007). Finally, it is important to guard against promoting hypervisibility, where the gendered nature of civilian victimization becomes a site of focus, wonderment, and persecution but the attention itself is a destructive or disruptive force (e.g., Lamble 2009). 

In this (intellectual and political advocacy) focus the links between sexisms and the theory and practice of war are important. Betty Reardon (1985: 1) argued that sexism and the war system had similar ‘psychological and structural causes’ and contended that it was crucial that ‘we gain a sufficient understanding of the problems and their interrelationship to enable us to transcend them.’ While many aspects of Reardon’s work have since been expanded upon, critiqued, or improved, twenty-five years later this remains an important, and at least in part unfulfilled, mission for feminists looking at gender and conflict. In fact, much of the work seems to be going the other way – looking at gender as a part of, rather than co-constituted with, war and conflict. This research suggests renewed attention to the co-constitution of ‘sexism’ (or, as we would say, gender hierarchy) and ‘the war system’ (or, as we would say, security/securitization) would be fruitful, and that the gendered logic productive of how civilians are treated in war might be a useful place to start. 
Laura Sjoberg 
University of Florida

























^1	 1  Though there are some (e.g., Carpenter 2005) who talk about sex-specific violations of men in the Bosnian War.
^2	  See, e.g., Nordstrom (1996); Lorentzen and Turpin (1998); Siefert (1996); Green (2004); Enloe (1993; 2000; 2010)
^3	  We do not mean to conflate state and nation. We find this argument generally applicable, but want to speak both to the civilian victimization literature in Security Studies (which is heavily statist) and the feminist literature on nation/nationalism. 
^4	  Elsthain 1987; Peach 1994; Kinsella 2005; Sjoberg 2006a; Sjoberg 2006b
^5	  See, e.g., Bush (2002) on the ‘war on terror’
^6	  See also Goldstein (2001)
^7	  We read this as implied by its omission from gender analysis
^8	  Notes taken from International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia cases Potocari and Sandici
^9	  E.g., Tickner 1992; Peterson and Runyan 1999; Peterson 1992; Sylvester 1994; Reardon 1985
^10	  e.g., K. R. Carter’s suggestion that IR think about rape as a weapon of war (2010), Mary Caprioli’s suggestion that IR think about gender inequality as a predictor of bellicosity (2004), or Charli Carpenter’s (2002) theoretical argument. 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